CNTI’S SUMMARY

Publishers, platforms and policymakers share a responsibility to respond to growing concerns around disinformation. It is increasingly important to understand and navigate challenging trade-offs between curbing problematic content and protecting independent journalism and fundamental human rights. Efforts to stem misinformation must ensure that governments cannot determine the news that the public receives or serve as arbitrators of truth or intent.

Legislation should articulate high-level goals, understand that initiatives in one country or online context inherently impacts other contexts and delegate enforcement to independent bodies with clear structures for transparency and accountability.

The Issue

The spread of false and misleading information is not a new problem and appears in many forms: online and offline, through public and private channels and across a variety of mediums. In a world with growing digital media platforms (where false and misleading information is rapidly spread and, at times, amplified), new technologies for digital manipulation, political upheavals in the Global North, coordinated election disinformation and hostile propaganda campaigns, problematic COVID-19 information, rampant denial of climate science and declining trust in institutions and news, the credibility of information the public gets online has become a global concern. 

Of particular importance, and the focus of this primer, is the impact of disinformation – false information created or spread with the intention to deceive or harm – on electoral processes, political violence and information systems around the world.

The level and impact of disinformation campaigns around the world have a wide range. Disinformation may come from people doctoring photos and creating memes that go viral, transnational actors and trolls seeking to sow distrust and confusion, and elected officials attempting to win elections, maintain power or incite hatred. 

Governments around the world are taking action to curb disinformation: some with the goal of supporting an informed citizenry and others with the goal of undermining it. Actions taken by one entity can impact other countries when groups in one country learn from and model successful efforts elsewhere. Digital platforms and interest groups have also put in place content moderation processes to stem disinformation (though some platforms have begun to move away from these efforts), but these can vary by language and context.

Among the many well-intended legislative proposals to address disinformation, one overarching concern is that the vagueness of what constitutes disinformation (especially the difficulty of interpreting actors’ intent) can result in policy that controls the press and limits free expression. Even legislation aimed at supporting an informed citizenry can potentially lead to restrictions on both the news media and the general public within a country. Further, policies that target disinformation can easily serve as models for authoritarian regimes or antidemocratic actors to exploit. In these cases, the actual – and, at times, intended – effects are restriction of media freedom, censorship of opposing voices and control of free expression. 

Thus, it is critical to balance the opportunities and risks of policy responses to the challenge of disinformation.

What Makes It Complex

State of Research

In recent years, as governments, platforms and funders turned their attention and investments toward policy and technical solutions to address mis- and disinformation (though this has started to wane), academic and media attention to the topic has dramatically increased. The research to date has produced helpful insights, including putting the scope of mis- and disinformation in context with other online content. The research field also has several shortcomings that reveal the need for a deeper and more global approach:

• Many studies of mechanisms to stem mis- and disinformation, such as fact–checking (which has leveled off), corrections, and media literacy initiatives, are robust in their methods but may be too piecemeal or too limited to lay out the full scope of the issue and what may or may not work to address it. Other interventions such as content labels, classifications, warnings or “pre-bunking” have proven to be counterproductive or inconsistently effective in practice. Even when strategies seem to work, it remains unclear whether the effects last.
• More broadly, drawbacks to existing research on disinformation include: concentration around a few wealthy democracies, disproportionate attention to the Global North and English-speaking communities, inconsistent concepts for and definitions of problematic information, limited understanding of the effects of media and media technologies, an overemphasis on social media platforms like Twitter and an underemphasis of the historical and political contexts of disinformation. 
• Some experts openly caution against the outsized influence of the current research on policy and political responses to disinformation, which they say has contributed to problematic actions or policies that threaten press freedom and human rights. 

Future work could provide more systematic global research needed to design more effective measures against mis- and disinformation. This includes studying the scale and impact of mis- and disinformation in countries outside of the U.S. and in comparative contexts. For instance, it is unclear whether strategies that are proven to be effective in countries with higher education and literacy levels would also apply elsewhere. There is also a need for understanding the agents and infrastructures involved in the spread of mis- and disinformation online and offline, particularly when it comes to video and image-based content as well as messaging applications. Finally, more data and research is needed to understand the effects that laws against disinformation – and related government action against platforms – have on civil liberties.

State of Legislation

The global landscape around what legislators consider harmful content or disinformation is diverse, often complicated and reaches back centuries in some countries. Legislators’ treatment of disinformation has ranged from a desire to protect election integrity against domestic or foreign interference to obvious schemes to stifle political dissent. There has been a considerably greater effort to regulate what can be said and by whom in recent years, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Efforts to respond to disinformation are critical, but policy must not set the stage for the dismantling of an independent press or an open internet. Specific areas of concern include:

• Both highly democratic countries and authoritarian regimes increasingly regulate online discourse. The latter regularly target critical voices under the banner of tackling disinformation, often by abusing a state of crisis or emergency to justify state censorship, and often without time limits. Measures may either have vague wordingand broad scope, thus intentionally or unintentionally creating room for misuse, or may be too narrow in scope to effectively combat disinformation.

• Sanctions within the legislative framework include financial penalties, jail time, bandwidth restrictions, advertising bans and blocking, depending on whether they address individuals or companies. Several challenges remain, including how to enforce regulations across borders (if the source for disinformation comes from a wholly different legal environment) as well as how to prevent “chilling effects” and self-censorship in newsrooms for fear of punishment.

• Even non-authoritarian governments have vastly different approaches toward what they deem illegal content. In the EU, companies hosting others’ data are liable if, upon actual knowledge of it, they fail to act and remove illegal content. This fundamentally differs from existing immunities in countries like the U.S., likely due to its historical commitment to free speech. This legal patchwork creates further challenges for transnational corporations.

• Despite the wealth of evidence that disinformation flows both top-down and bottom-up, policy attempting to address top-down disinformation (e.g., from domestic politicians or celebrities and foreign governments) has largely been absent while there has been an overwhelming focus on bottom-up mis- and disinformation (e.g., within platforms and their users).

As disinformation receives growing attention by elected leaders and academics, there should be a similar focus on legislative attempts to face a rapidly changing information environment. As much as possible, efforts need to be rooted in a clear understanding of the actors and their differing roles as well as in protection for an independent press, freedom of expression and fundamental human rights. Both the inadequacies and best practices of existing global legislation must be discussed openly. Additionally, in rule-of-law countries, there is a need for more political and public awareness that legislation may be weaponized by authoritarian regimes, worsening already restrictive situations for human rights groups, political opposition and independent news media.

Notable Legislation

Australia

Australia’s parliament is drafting legislation that would give the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) the ability to fine digital platforms if they fail to remove mis- and disinformation. Currently, news publisher content is excluded from oversight. Concerns include how the bill will define mis- and disinformation, how and to what extent the ACMA would govern this process and what mechanisms will exist for appeals.

Brazil

Brazil’s PL 2630 (known as the “Fake News” bill) failed a fast-track vote in April 2022 and stalled again in May 2023. Among other features, PL 2630 would require platforms to detect and remove illegal content. Concerns about the bill include its threat to free expression and potential to compensate creators of disinformation. Aggressive platform responses to shape public debate received international criticism, and experts noted concerns with the overall escalation of responses.

Read more here.

China

In May 2023, the Cyberspace Administration of China launched a campaign to close more than 100,000 online accounts that disseminate what the CAC referred to as “fake news,” including AI-generated impersonations of state-controlled media.

Croatia

As of late 2023, the Croatian government is considering legislation that would make leaking information before and during a criminal trial illegal. Members of the Croatian press are concerned the proposed legislation could be used to target both whistleblowers and the journalists they contact. The president of Croatia and other government officials claim the proposal is aimed at protecting the validity of investigations and assuring the presumption of innocence.

European Union

Approved in November 2022, the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) package aimed to update the existing EU legal framework and address issues such as illegal content, transparent advertising and disinformation. It seeks to harmonize various national laws created in recent years. Service providers will have until January 2024 to comply with its provisions.

Hungary

In 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Hungary’s parliament passed measures including jail terms for journalists and others spreading pandemic “misinformation.”

Nicaragua

In 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Nicaragua’s congress passed measures regulating what can be published on social media platforms and by news publishers, including jail terms for publishing “false and/or misrepresented information.” The legislation has been condemned as attempts to silence political opposition to President Daniel Ortega.

Papua New Guinea

Proposed in early 2023, the Papua New Guinea government’s draft national media development policy to promote “a professional, ethical, and responsible media industry” would require “media outlets” and journalists to apply for accreditation or a license. The policy notes that it is intended to address misinformation, among other goals, but offers a narrow window for stakeholder feedback and may undermine media independence and freedoms.

Russia

In January 2017, amendments to Russia’s № 208-FZ entered into force that made owners of news aggregators liable for spreading so-called “fake news.” Links to news items that originate verbatim from media outlets registered in Russia (and thus state-regulated) are exempt from liability. The law has effectively created a mechanism of media control through existing media regulation structures. Concerns include the amendments’ vague wording increasing state intervention and power.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s government, facing a barrage of foreign disinformation, has established government initiatives and partnerships with technology companies like Line to track and debunk disinformation. Policymakers have considered bills to curb disinformation on TikTok. In February 2023, proposed amendments to Taiwan’s defense mobilization act included setting penalties for spreading disinformation. Concerns include whether this could be used to silence domestic political dissent.

Türkiye

In October 2022, Turkish parliament adopted legislation that allowed for jailing journalists and social media users for spreading “disinformation,” significantly threatening press freedom and free speech in the country.

United Kingdom

The U.K.’s Online Safety Act, a complicated and sweeping set of measures, is intended to counter a broad range of digital harms. Measures that would have forced social media platforms to remove “legal but harmful” content were cut after critics argued the legislation threatened free expression. The Online Safety Act was passed by Parliament in October 2023. 

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